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This analysis of New York's civil rights 
legislation does not decisively answer the 
question of whether the courts are more 
effective than the streets. One thing is cer­
tain: the legislative and judicial processes 
Recent Decision: 
Bible Reading in 
the Public Schools­
Neutrality v. Realism 
"The breach of neutrality that is today 
a trickling stream may all too soon become 
a raging torrent. . . . "1 With these words 
the Supreme Court summarized what it 
hoped to prevent in its role as protector 
of the religious liberties guaranteed by the 
first amendment. 
In two separate cases, parents and stu­
dents, who conscientiously object to the 
tenets of the Bible, notwithstanding the 
exemption from participation granted stu­
dents upon written excuse, challenged the 
practices of Maryland and Pennsylvania 
which required their public school systems 
to have daily reading of Biblical verses 
without comment. The Supreme Court of 
the United States in deciding both cases 
simultaneously held that such required 
reading was a use of public facilities and 
faculty for primarily religious purposes 
thus violating the rule of governmental 
neutrality dictated by the first amendment. 
School Dist. of Abington Township v. 
Schempp, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 4683 (U.S. 
June 17, 1963). 
While the issue of required Bible read­
ing, as such, had never before been squarely 
1 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 
31 U.S.L. WEEK 4683, 4689 (U.S. June 17, 1963). 
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move more slowly than the picketing and 
sit-in demonstrations. But another aspect is 
also evident: they are peaceful and, per­
haps, more certain. 
decided by the Supreme Court, 2 it had been 
the frequent cause of litigation in the state 
courts. Most of the courts, in deciding 
whether this practice exceeded the al­
lowance of the first amendment, had ap­
plied the "non-sectarian" test, i.e., if the 
religious exercise was nondiscriminatory 
and favored no religious sect, the religious 
freedoms would not be violated. 3 Many 
courts dismissed the complaints of those 
discriminated against as being incidental to 
the secular purpose of infusing morality into 
secular school teachings. 4 Other jurisdic­
tions have held that the Bible does not 
teach the dogmas of any sect unless it is 
accompanied by some comment or inter­
pretation. 5 In fact, one court declared that 
2 This case was the first of its kind to be decided 
in the federal court system. Harrison, The Bible, 
the Constitution and Public Education, 29 TENN. 
L. REv. 363 (1962). In Doremus v. Board of 
Educ., 343 U.S. 429 (1952), the Court was faced 
with the issue of Bible reading in public schools, 
but dismissed the case on procedural grounds. 
3 People v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 Pac. 610 
(1927); Kaplan v. Independent School Dist., 171 
Minn. 142, 214 N.W. 18 (1927). 
4 E.g., Spiller v. Woburn, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 
127 (1866); Wall v. Cooke, 7 Am. L. Reg. 417 
(Mass. 1859); compare Church v. Bullock, 104 
Tex. 1, 109 S.W. 115 (1908). 
5 Hackett v. Brooksdale, 120 Ky. 608, 87 S.W. 
792 (1905); Lewis v. Board of Educ., 157 Misc. 
520, 285 N.Y. Supp. 164 (Sup. Ct. 1935), modi­
fied on other grounds, 247 App. Div. 106, 286 
N.Y. Supp. 174 (1st Dep't 1936), appeal dis­
missed, 276 N.Y. 490, 12 N.E.2d 172 (1937). 
NOTES AND COMMENTS
the Bible was non-sectarian on the ground
that our nation is founded on Christianity
and hence, the Bible was actually the
foundation of our laws, customs and in-
stitutions. 6 On the other hand, the Bible
reading requirements of certain school dis-
tricts have been declared unconstitutional
with far more consistency.
7
In Herold v. Parish Bd. of School Di-
rectors,s the reading of the New Testament
as the Word of God was declared to be
discriminatory against the Jewish people.
Despite a clause excusing religious dis-
senters, the law was declared unconsti-
tutional because it tended either to force
the pupil to participate against the dictates
of his religion or to subject him to a
religious stigma in being placed in a class
by himself. Bible reading practices have
also been declared unconstitutional at the
instance of Catholics who have objected to
6Stevenson v. Hanyon, 7 Pa. Dist. 585, 590
(1898).
7 "[I]n our opinion the reading of the Bible and
repeating of the Lord's Prayer without comment
in opening exercises is necessarily devotional....
The cases sustaining Bible reading in school exer-
cises consistently evade or ignore this fact and
thereby fall into error." State ex rel. Finger v.
Weedman, 55 S.D. 343, 351, 226 N.W. 348, 352
(1929); "The only means of preventing sectarian
instruction in the school is to exclude altogether
religious instruction, by means of the reading of
the Bible or otherwise. The Bible is not read in the
public schools as mere literature or mere history.
It cannot be separated from its character as an in-
spired book of religion." People ex rel. Ring v.
Board of Educ., 245 II1. 334, 348, 92 N.E. 251,
255 (1910); "[Tlhe Bible contains numerous doc-
trinal passages upon some of which the peculiar
creed of almost every religious sect is based ... "
State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd. of School Dist.
No. 8 of Edgerton, 76 Wis. 177, 194, 44 N.W. 967,
973 (1890); State ex rel. Dearle v. Frazier, 102
Wash. 369, 376, 173 Pac. 35, 37 (1918); cf. State
ex rel. Freeman v. Schive, 65 Neb. 853, 91 N.W.
846 (1902), modified, 65 Neb. 876, 93 N.W. 169
(1903); State ex rel. Clithers v. Showalter, 159
Wash. 519, 293 Pac. 1000 (1930).
the use of the King James version or have
objected to the reading of the Bible with-
out, what they felt was, the proper inter-
pretationY
The Supreme Court first exercised its
influence in this area in the case of Cant-
well v. Connecticut,'" holding that the liber-
ties protected by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment include the free-
doms and liberties of religion established
by the first amendment. Prior to that de-
cision the states were generally free through
the regulation of public education to sub-
stantially influence religious matters. The
Court had interfered with the states only
when the states' infringement on religious
rights was coupled with an infringement
upon property without due process of law."
In the Cantwell case as well as in many
subsequent decisions the Court was con-
cerned with either the states' prevention
of the free exercise of religion or with the
free exercise of speech in religious matters. 1"
In Cantwell the Court specifically declared
unconstitutional a law under which two
Jehovah Witnesses were convicted for
soliciting funds without a permit. The
Court found that although the states have
8 136 La. 1034, 68 So. 116 (1915).
OPeople ex rel. Ring v. Board of Educ., supra
note 7; State v. District Bd. of School Dist. No. 8
of Edgerton, supra note 7. Contra, Kaplan v. In-
dependent School Dist., supra note 3.
10 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
"1 E.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923).
"2E.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961);
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Nie-
motko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); see
Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624
(1943), where the Court, in striking down a stat-
ute requiring the expulsion of any student who
refused to recite the pledge of allegiance, stated
that the purpose of the first amendment is to
preserve religious rights from all official control.
a right to protect citizens by regulating
solicitations of money, Connecticut should
have chosen one of the available means
which did not tend to place a prior restraint
on free speech in religious matters. 3 The
Court recognized, however, an important
distinction between freedom to believe and
freedom to act, holding the former to be
absolute but the latter subject to regula-
tion.'"
In Everson v. Board of Educ.,15 the
Court allowed state reimbursement of citi-
zens who expended money for bus fares by
sending their students to private schools.
Mr. Justice Black, writing for the majority,
stated that:
We must be careful in protecting the
citizens of New Jersey against state-estab-
lished churches, to be sure that we do not
inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from
extending its general state law benefits to
all its citizens without regard to their
religious belief. 1b
He was, however, careful to distinguish
between the expenditures of tax money
for the purpose of supporting religious
activities (which he thought would be un-
constitutional) and the expenditure of tax
money for the general welfare of all chil-
dren of school age regardless of the school
they attended. He held the latter to be
constitutional notwithstanding the fact that
such expenditures might indirectly assist
some church by encouraging a parent to
send his child to a more distant religious
institution.' 7
13The Supreme Court in what amounted to a
corollary to the Cantwell decision held uncon-
stitutional a law requiring a license to sell re-
ligious papers. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 (1943).
14Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04
(1940).
1" 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
16 Id. at 16.
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This principle of indirect aid was also
applied by the Supreme Court in affirming
the validity of Sunday Closing Laws. 18 The
Court was careful to point out that the
questioned laws were designed to ac-
complished a necessary secular purpose,
namely to provide a respite from work, and
that these laws were only incidentally bene-
ficial or discriminatory toward certain re-
ligions. 19
In Engel v. Vitale,'0 the highly celebrated
School Prayer Case, the Court struck down
the non-sectarian Regents Prayer as being a
violation of the "establishment clause." The
Court stated that this religious exercise,
sponsored by a governmental body, tended
to coerce religious minorities to conform to
the prevailing religious beliefs. 21 Mr. Justice
Douglas, in a concurring opinion, stated
that the Regents Prayer amounted to a use
of public facilities for a religious exercise.
He felt that any use of public facilities for
17 In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203 (1948), the majority stated that
sending religious educators into public schools
was beyond doubt a utilization of the tax sup-
ported public school system as an aid to religious
groups in spreading their faiths and hence un-
constitutional. However, in Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306 (1952), the Court held that released
time instructions did not violate the first amend-
ment.
18 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two
Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
1'"[I]f the State regulates conduct by enacting
a general law within its power, the purpose and
effect of which is to advance the State's secular
goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect bur-
den on religious observance unless the State may
accomplish its purpose by means which do not
impose such a burden." Braunfeld v. Brown,
supra note 18, at 607.
20 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
211d. at 430. "[F]reedom of worship ... may not
be submitted to a vote ... "West Virginia Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, supra note 12, at 638.
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such a purpose would be unconstitutional.22
In retrospect, the entire line of Supreme
Court decisions prior to the newly decided
Bible case indicated that the Court would
be most unwilling to accept as constitutional
any use of public facilities, personnel, or
funds exclusively or primarily for the teach-
ing of religion. Lower courts, for the most
part, have held prescribed Bible reading to
be violative of the first amendment. In the
light of such background, the Court's de-
cision in the Bible case is neither surprising
nor unprecedented, but rather, the next step
in a logical progression of decision aimed
at religious neutrality.
In the principal case, the first fact situa-
tion concerned the Schempp children who
attended the local high school. They were
Unitarians and, therefore, not in accord
with the teachings of the Bible. Each morn-
ing in accordance with a Pennsylvania
statute,23 the school conducted a salute
to the flag followed by a reading of ten
verses from the Bible and concluded by
a recitation of the Lord's Prayer. Although
the school district had supplied copies of
only the King James version, other ver-
sions could be used. There were no pre-
fatory statements and no comments on the
verses chosen. The children were informed
that they could absent themselves from the
service. Their father testified that although
he had considered having the children
excused from the service he declined to
do so, fearing that the "children's relation-
ships with their teachers and classmates
could be adversely affected. ' '24 A religious
expert testified that if portions of the Bible
were read without explanations it could be
221d. at 441.
2 3 PA. STAT. tit. 24, §15-1516 (Supp. 1960).
24 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
31 U.S.L. WEEK 4683, 4684 (U.S. June 17, 1963).
psychologically harmful to children of
various sects. The district court granted
the injunction sought by the Schempp
family and the Abington School District
appealed to the Supreme Court.25
The second set of facts discussed by the
principal decision concerned a mother and
son, both professed atheists. In 1905 the
Board of School Commissioners of Balti-
more adopted a rule providing for the read-
ing of a chapter of the Bible without com-
ment as an opening exercise in the
schools. 2 Although the son had been ex-
cused from the exercise, petitioners brought
a writ of mandamus claiming that the
practice discriminated against them by
placing a "premium on belief as against
nonbelief and subjects this freedom of con-
science to the rule of the majority. ' ' 27 The
Court of Appeals of Maryland denied the
relief sought and an appeal was taken to
the Supreme Court.28
Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the major-
ity, concluded that the federal government
can neither favor a given religion nor "aid
those religions based on a belief in the
existence of God as against those religions
founded on different beliefs. '29 The Court
held that the government must remain
neutral not only to prevent a breach of the
"establishment clause" but also to avoid
violations of the "free exercise clause"
25 Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington Township,
177 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1959), appeal vacated
and remanded, 364 U.S. 298 (1960), 201 F. Supp.
815 (E.D. Pa. 1962), prob. juris. noted, 371 U.S.
807 (1962); 30 FORD L. REV. 801 (1962); 28
GEO WASH. L. REV. 519 (1960).2 6 MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, §202 (1957).
27 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
supra note 24, at 4685.
28 Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, 179 A.2d 698,
cert. granted, 371 U.S. 809 (1962).
29 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
supra note 24, at 4689.
which guarantees the right of free choice
of worship without compulsion. The opin-
ion, in establishing the test for determining
violations of the first amendment, found the
determinative factors to be the primary
purpose and the primary effect of the
legislation. To avoid the strictures of the
"establishment clause," the primary pur-
pose of the legislation must be secular
while at the same time it may neither ad-
vance nor inhibit religion. To avoid the
restraints of the "free exercise clause" the
legislation must not act coercively to the
detriment of an individual in the practice
of his religion. The latter would require
definite proof of the harm to the com-
plainant whereas the former would not.30
Having thus established the test, the
Court applied it to the statutes at issue and
found that such prescribed reading of the
Bible was unquestionably religious in
nature and that it tended to be coercive
since one must either participate or be
religiously stigmatized. Although the Court
never specified which clause (establishment
or free exercise) had been violated, it con-
cluded that this use of public funds, facili-
ties and faculty to teach religion was a
violation of governmental neutrality. 31
Mr. Justice Stewart, in his dissenting
opinion, expressed the belief that neither
Supreme Court precedent nor the first
amendment required the complete seculari-
zation of the public school systems.3 2 In
contradistinction to the concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Douglas, he claimed that
there was no constitutional prohibition on
30 Id. at 4688; Sutherland, Establishment Accord-
ing to Engel, 76 HARV. L. REV. 25, 26-27 (1963).
31 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
supra note 24, at 4690.
32 Id. at 4715; see Costanzo, Prayer in Public
Schools, 8 CATHOLIC LAWYER 269, 278 (1962).
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the use of public facilities for religious
purposes. In fact, he argued that such
prohibition would place religion at "an
artificial and state created disadvantage." 33
It was Justice Stewart's contention that as
long as variations in the particular Bible to
be used existed, no particular religion is
favored; hence no religion is established.
He conceded, however, that absent such
tolerated variation the law in question might
well be unconstitutional. Justice Stewart
hence found no violation of the "establish-
ment clause." With regard to the "free
exercise clause," he claimed the majority
had failed to satisfy its own requirement-
proof of the harm to the complainant. In
the Schempp case, the first set of facts with
which the Court was faced, the only evi-
dence presented was Mr. Schempp's "proph-
ecy" that he was afraid that his children
would be socially harmed; and in the second
fact situation, there was no evidence in-
troduced since the original case was tried
on a demurrer. Since the "establishment
clause" had not been violated and there was
insufficient evidence to prove any harm to
the complainant, Justice Stewart concluded
that neither Bible reading statute should
have been declared unconstitutional. 34
It would appear that the principal de-
cision is truly significant for the legal ques-
tions it leaves unanswered in its insistence
on neutrality, and also for the notoriety
it has created in the public mind and press.
The first question usually asked when the
Court strikes down a religious act long
practiced in public schools concerns the pos-
sible removal of the word "God" from the
33 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
31 U.S.L. WEEK 4683, 4716 (U.S. June 17, 1963)
(dissenting opinion of Stewart).34 Id. at 4718.
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pledge of allegiance, from our currency and
from all public edifices. Apparently to
avoid the adverse public reaction with
which the School Prayer Case was received,
the concurring opinions of Justices Gold-
berg and Harlan were careful to illustrate
that the present decision did not extend that
far. In fact, they virtually ratified such
practices as being within constitutional
limits. Even the majority went so far as to
explain that the reading of the Bible for
literary purposes or the teaching of a course
in comparative religions would be con-
stitutionally permissible in the public
schools as long as no particular religion
was favored.3 5
The second and far more serious ques-
tion concerns the secularization of public
school training.36 When the Supreme Court
in an effort to remove all religious training
from public education prevents teaching
about God, does it create a maintainable
vacuum or does it promote another re-
ligious philospohy? Perhaps this question
can best be answered by an example. Most
educators will agree that an educational
system must teach social values. The
courses must explain, in some way, man's
relationship with his country and with his
fellow man. We must either choose to
teach social values or we must choose
not to teach them. The latter course would
seem to make public education meaningless
and necessarily render it valueless. 3 7 On
35Id. at 4689; Pfeffer, Court, Constitution and
Prayer, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 735, 750 (1962).
3"The extention of the 'secularism' concept is
most evident in the history of Schempp v. Ab-
ington Township School Dist." Note, Church-
State Religious Institutions and Values, 37 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 649, 672 (1962) (discussion of district
court decision).
37 PRESTON, TEACHING SOCIAL STUDIES IN THE
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL 25 (2d ed. 1961); FITZ-
the other hand, if we are to teach social
values we are faced with a second choice
which has been complicated by the prin-
cipal decision for we must apply either a
theistic or a non-theistic philosophy in ex-
plaining man's relationships. To apply a
theistic philosophy would be to violate the
specific dictates of this case since such an
approach would not appear to be neutral.
Yet to apply a non-theistic approach seems
no more neutral since it would favor such
non-theistic religions as the Ethical Culture
Society, the American Secular Union, or
the Secular Humanists. These are religions
just as much as Catholicism, Judaism or
Protestantism," s although there exists a
dichotomy in basic beliefs. "The fundamen-
tal principle of Secularism is that in his
whole conduct, man should be guided ex-
clusively by considerations derived from the
present life itself. This principle is in strict
opposition to essential Catholic doctrines." 9
Since the application of either philosophy
to the teaching of social values would ap-
pear to favor some religion, social values
may not be taught because the means of
the teaching should be declared uncon-
stitutional as a violation of the rule of strict
neutrality. The essence of the problem is that
GERALD & FITZGERALD, METHODS AND CURRICULA
IN ELEMENTARY EDUCATION 8-10 (2d ed. 1956);
HARTLEY, PROBLEMS IN PREJUDICE (1946).
38 Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda,
153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957);
Washington Ethical Society v. District of Colum-
bia, 249 F.2d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
"XlI CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 676, 677 (1913).
"The essential thesis of the Ethical Movement
• ..is that morals, ethical conduct, and right
living are good in themselves and for that reason
must be practiced and not because of any com-
mand or sanction of any duty or Supreme Being."
Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda,
supra note 38, at 403-04; see generally, Ball, The
School Prayer Case, 8 CATHOLIC LAWYER 182,
195 (1962).
the Supreme Court attempts to select neu-
trality when faced with an either-or choice.
The goal of neutrality is admirable, but in the
area of public education it is unattainable. 4
It has long been the rule that if there is a
secular goal to be achieved and its im-
plementation indirectly leads to discrim-
ination against some particular sect, such
implementation would not be struck down
as unconstitutional.4 1 When we are in an
area where we must favor one religious
group or another, the majority should be
accommodated.
4 2
The teaching of social values can be
compared to the area of the Sunday Closing
Laws. In 1848, Specht v. Commonwealth43
outlined what was to become the rationale
for most Sunday Closing Law decisions.
The decision indicated that periods of rest
were absolutely necessary to the well being
of society and further that such periods
must occur at regular intervals. The Court
stated that,
one day must be selected, and... the week
presents none which ... might not be re-
garded as favoring some one of the numer-
ous religious sects .... In a Christian
community ... it is not surprising that Sun-
day should have received legislative sanc-
tion.
44
In teaching social values and in requiring
40 See Kurland, Of Church and State and the
Supreme Court, 29 U. OF CHI. L, REV. 1, 96
(1961); Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality
in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. OF CHI. L.
REV. 661 (1960); Katz, Freedom of Religion and
State Neutrality, 20 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 426, 438
(1953).
41 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961);
Two Guys v. McGinly, 366 U.S. 582, 595 (1961);
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939);
Pfeffer, Court, Constitution and Prayer, supra
note 35, at 744.
42 Costanzo, Prayer in Public Schools, 8 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 269, 277 (1962).
43 8 Pa. (Barr) 312 (1848).
44 1d. at 323.
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Sunday closings the purpose is the same,
namely, to prevent the breakdown of the
social order-a secular purpose. 45 In both
cases the implementation must favor one
religion, yet in the application of these
principles to like facts, the Supreme Court
decisions would apparently require a differ-
ent result. Sunday Closing Laws which
favor religion in economic areas are de-
clared legal but secular teaching which
favors a religion in public schools is un-
constitutional.
The Court's decision in the Bible case
would appear to be more readily justifiable
on the grounds that required Bible reading
is a breach of the "establishment clause"
rather than its being a breach of neutrality.
The Bible would seem to violate the "estab-
lishment clause" because of its highly sec-
tarian nature .4 While the use of the Bible
itself is not sectarian it becomes so when an
individual reads from one particular ver-
sion.4 7 It would appear, therefore, that the
Court has correctly decided that the re-
quired reading of the Bible is unconstitu-
tional as a violation of the first amendment,
but not for the reason given by the majority.
As Mr. Justice Stewart stated in his
dissent, neutrality cannot be the goal of the
Supreme Court. When the Court attempts
to divorce God from lessons in the public
schools, it merely favors other religious
sects, the non-theists. Doesn't it appear that
45 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 436
(1961); Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710
(1885).
41 "Any instruction on any one of the subjects is
necessarily sectarian, because, while it may be
consistent with the doctrine of one or many of
the sects, it will be inconsistent with the doctrines
of one or more of them." People ex rel. Ring v.
Board of Educ., 245 Ill. 334, 348, 92 N.E. 251,
255 (1910).
47 KAUPER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 4-5 (1962); Kurland, The Regents Prayer
Case, 1962 SUPREME COURT REV. 1, 33.
 
